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BODY POLLUTED: QUESTIONS OF SCALE,
GENDER, AND REMEDY
Dayna Nadine Scott*
This Article offers a critique of tort remedies grounded in feminist
theory of the body. It demonstrates how tort law is invested in a notion
of an individuated legal subject, which fails to capture the critical
interconnectedness of bodies in a social, political, historical, and
colonial context. Taking the "injury" of endocrine disruption in a
Canadian Aboriginal community as an example of a contemporary
pollution harm, the analysis considers various torts on a conceptual
level, and what they might offer the Aamjiwnaang First Nation in the
way of remedies. In each case, what the tort can do depends on how the
injury, and the scale at which the entity taken to have suffered the
injury, is conceived.
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BODY POLLUTED
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article explores whether tort law can provide a remedy for
the injury of "endocrine disruption"' at an individual or a collective
level. Many activists in the environmental justice movement want to
say unequivocally that the "gender-bending" of endocrine disruption
is a new, dramatic, and horrifying harm. The example of the
declining sex ratio of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation
("Aamjiwnaang"), a Canadian Aboriginal community experiencing
chronic chemical pollution, demonstrates that finding a "harm" or
"injury" in law is fraught with difficulties. On an individual level, an
altered sex ratio (the number of boy babies born relative to the
number of girl babies) cannot constitute a harm. No single
Aboriginal mother could prove that the pollution had specifically
prevented her from conceiving a boy-that she had suffered a harm
because she should have conceived a boy. But her chances of
welcoming a son seem to be less than they should be. The concern,
from the perspective of the Aamjiwnaang, is essentially one of
cultural survival. It is the collective loss of a viable future. Thus, the
notion of a collective harm highlights the fact that this problem is
situated in the context of an Aboriginal community already
struggling, as many are, with stemming the loss of culture and
tradition amongst its people. Further, because emerging
environmental health harms are often localized and concentrated
around the worst pollution sources, and because they are often
distributed along race and class differentials, endocrine disruption is
a central concern of the environmental justice movement.2
Understanding the nature of contemporary pollution harms is
essential to the crafting of effective remedies. In particular, this
Article seeks to destabilize the tendency in the environmental justice
movement to conceptualize harms on the basis of unquestioned
assumptions about what is "natural" and what is "normal"-
assumptions that fly in the face of developments in sex and gender
1. The theory of endocrine disruption posits that certain synthetic chemicals that share
structural features with common sex hormones can mimic hormone action in the body, triggering
a host of growth, metabolic, and reproductive processes and thus having far reaching and diverse
effects on health. For more on endocrine disruption, see infra Part III.B and Dayna Nadine Scott,
"Gender-Benders ": Sex and Law in the Constitution of Polluted Bodies, 17 FEMINIST LEGAL
STUD. 241, 243, 248-49 (2009).
2. Id. at 243-44.
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theory. It also seeks to challenge tort scholars to imagine law
differently. "Legal scholars have begun exploring the idea that tort
law is too corporeal-that it is tethered too tightly to proof of
physical damages-and should move towards the recognition of
'interests-based' damage assessments in specific contexts."3 But even
where recent tort scholarship has included some calls to expand what
should count as harm or physical damage, the scale at which we look
to find such damage remains primarily at the level of the
individual-the single unitary legal subject. Perhaps, as has been
suggested, we should move away from assessing physical damage
only on the basis of a factually observable change in the physical
structure of persons and adopt a more contextual approach based on
social perceptions of damage. The way that pollution manifests-and
the blameworthiness of its perpetuation in certain communities-
demands that tort law evolve, and that we, as legal scholars, work
creatively to devise new legal remedies for emerging injuries.
This Article offers a critique of tort remedies grounded in
feminist theory of the body. It exposes how tort law is invested in a
notion of an individuated legal subject that, in the case of
Aamjiwnaang First Nation, fails to capture the critical
interconnectedness of bodies in a community-in a social, political,
historical, and colonial context. The analysis considers various torts
on a conceptual level and what each might offer the Aamjiwnaang in
the way of remedies. In each case, the remedies provided for the torts
depend on how the injury-and the scale at which we find the
injury-are conceived.
This Article finds that none of these remedies adequately
account for the way pollution has saturated the Aamjiwnaang
community, been soaked up in bodies, and altered social and cultural
relations. But brainstorming around tort law's potential remedies at
various scales allows for the body to be opened up-for the gender-
bending synthetic chemicals flowing through bodies to become
visible, to expose their free movement between individuals and their
worlds-to the point that our insistence on a fixed bodily boundary,
and a centrally controlled self, begins to break down. Further, the
analysis demonstrates that the scale at which we conceive of an
3. Id. at 258.
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"injury" shapes the determination of whether, and on what terms, the
injury is seen as "remediable." These conceptions and determinations
then, in turn, shape ideas about allocating blame for the harm.
Essentially, the argument is that our constructions of "injury"-
where and how we choose to find it-carry consequences for
communities affected by contemporary pollution harms.
The Article consists of three parts. In Part II, I review the
contamination of the Aamjiwnaang and describe how the struggle of
this small reserve community and its campaign against endocrine
disruption have garnered the attention of environmental justice
activists worldwide.' In Part III, I explain how tort law might
conceive of the harm or the injury that is visited on the
Aamjiwnaang, including what the gender dimension of that harm
might be. Finally, in Part IV, I begin to brainstorm how various torts
might operate at different scales of injury to provide a remedy for the
Aamjiwnaang people.
II. THE CONTAMINATION OF AAMJIWNAANG FIRST NATION
For the residents of Aamjiwnaang First Nation, living
in the shadow of Canada's "Chemical Valley," a recent
epidemiological study confirmed what they had suspected
for years-that the community's sex ratio (the number of
boy babies born relative to the number of girls) is declining
at an alarming rate. It is widely speculated that chronic
exposure to toxic chemical pollution, specifically a group of
endocrine-disrupting chemicals provocatively nicknamed
the "gender-benders," is responsible....
The Aamjiwnaang First Nation is a community of
approximately 900 Aanishinaabek people living on a
reserve located immediately adjacent to Sarnia's notorious
[petrochemical corridor]. This area of southwestern
Ontario, located at the southern tip of Lake Huron,
bordering Michigan, USA, houses one of Canada's largest
concentrations of industry, including several large
4. This case study draws largely on work that has been published elsewhere. See Dayna
Nadine Scott, Confronting Chronic Pollution: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Risk and Precaution, 46
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 293 (2008) [hereinafter Scott, Chronic Pollution]; Scott, supra note 1.
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petrochemical, polymer, and chemical industrial plants, as
well as coal-fired utilities on both sides of the border. In
recent years, residents of the reserve began to wonder about
why they were starting to require two softball teams to
accommodate the girls on reserve, and they could barely
field one team of boys. Soon, they had documented a
marked decrease in the number of males born into their
community. An investigation was launched to explain this
phenomenon, and the Aamjiwnaang First Nation now has
the unwelcome distinction of the world's lowest
documented birth ratio.
The study suggests that the noted decline in sex ratio
could be correlated with the community members' exposure
to industrial pollutants. Other studies conducted in this
region have found changes in the sex ratios and
reproductive ability of fish, bird and turtle populations,
which are thought to be due to exposures to endocrine-
disrupting chemicals. Endocrine disruptors are said to have
a hormone-mimicking effect. They may induce long-term
effects upon low-dose exposures in susceptible
developmental phases. There are a number of competing
hypotheses for how, specifically, these environmental
contaminants disrupt the human endocrine system, and how
they might be influencing sex ratio. [According to t]he
hypothesis with the most traction[,] .. . interference with a
mother's hormonal milieu at key developmental stages very
early in a pregnancy can induce sex-specific mortality in
miscarriage. Essentially, the hypothesis is that embryos that
would become boy babies are being disproportionately lost
in early miscarriages, usually occurring before the
prospective mother even becomes aware that she may have
been pregnant.
Advocates railing against chronic pollution and
contamination are increasingly identifying with and being
inspired by the environmental justice movement. These
activists see "connections between social welfare and the
environment, pollution and the home, and pollution and
discrimination, that have gone unnoticed (or conveniently
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ignored) by mainstream environmentalists." A central focus
is the notion of disproportionate burdens-the claim that
while pollution is everywhere, it is most easily found in a
few choice places, particularly those inhabited by the poor,
the racialised, and the marginalised. The focus of
organising is on the fundamental power differential that
exists between the polluters and the polluted. As a result,
many activists in the environmental justice movement want
to be able to say unequivocally that the "gender-bending"
of endocrine disruption is a new, dramatic and horrifying
harm.....
The central claim of the environmental justice
movement-that some of us live more downstream than
others-is a stark and obvious truth in Sarnia's Chemical
Valley. Talfourd Creek gathers its waters in an industrial
corridor [that is] home to 40% of Canada's chemical
production before it meanders through the Aamjiwnaang
reserve and empties into the St. Clair River. There are 62
large emitting industrial facilities within 25 [kilometers] of
the reserve. In 2005 there were 5.7 million kilograms of
toxic air pollutants released from the facilities on the
Canadian side of the border alone. The Aamjiwnaang First
Nation, confined to a small portion of [its] traditional
territory by colonialist law, has been steadily surrounded by
industry and many residents now feel that it is being slowly
choked out by the legacy of a century of petrochemical
production.
Contamination of their bodies and their traditional
territory has had an enormous emotional effect on the
community. While the skewed sex ratio may be a potent
symbol of the complexity of contemporary pollution harms,
it is by no means the only manifestation of the pervasive,
diffuse and body-altering pollution that the residents report.
They experience elevated rates of cancer and diabetes,
developmental and attention-deficit disorders, [and] asthma
and other respiratory ailments. The recent years have
witnessed a building anger as residents learn of the extent
of their health problems and the mounting evidence linking
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those problems to the actions of their industrial neighbors.
They are a deeply injured community.'
III. IDENTIFYING THE INJURY
Communities struggling with contamination face significant
challenges in seeking to achieve "environmental justice" through tort
litigation.' These toxic torts are, in fact, notoriously difficult to win;
the injury suffered by the Aamjiwnaang is a classic example of how
contemporary pollution harms are currently beyond the reach of
effective resolution through tort law.
To find an injury in law we need to identify a cause
and effect relationship that culminates in a tangible harm.
Not only is the causality contested in this case, but a
tangible harm is elusive. Thinking specifically of the issue
of the declining sex ratio, how [should] we characterise
what has been lost in the Aamjiwnaang situation? Only
chances-chances to welcome sons. No one mother could
ever prove that she specifically was harmed; that she
specifically should have conceived a boy. No child has been
harmed. But it is difficult to fathom that there is no harm
being done. It is clear that there is wounding to be
accounted for.
Cultural anthropologist Sarah Lochlann Jain employs
the term "wound" to capture the sense that harms exist out
there in the world that are not contained in the legal notion
of "injury." And, as she reminds us, "wellness and
wounding will always be at play within various cross-
cutting hierarchies" pre-existing in our society.
"[W]ounding itself," Jain states, "brings a mode of attention
to objects into being . . . objects only emerge as separate
from the [agent] when something goes wrong." It is as if the
chronic chemical pollution in the streams, rivers, air, and
soil of the Aamjiwnaang reserve is suddenly rendered
5. Scott, supra note 1, at 241-44 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
6. See Melissa Toffolon-Weiss & J. Timmons Roberts, Toxic Torts, Public Interest Law,
and Environmental Justice: Evidence from Louisiana, 26 LAW & POL'Y 259, 261 (2004).
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visible by the duly documented epidemiological study of
the plummeting sex ratio....
How should we understand the harm or the injury that
the Aamjiwnaang community has suffered, and continues to
suffer? Or, as a colleague (half-jokingly) put it to me,
"What's the harm in a few less men?" Why does this sex
ratio dynamic, a declining proportion of boys born into a
community, present a challenge to [tort law]? In this part, I
employ Jain's critique of "injury" in law to unpack the issue
of harm presented by this particular environmental health
problem.'
Jain observes that
[tjort law's prerequisite .. . is that the (injured) "physical
body ... come[] to the table as a preceding artifact being
reclaimed after having been unjustly altered." It is offered
up as collateral for the "justness" of a legal logic through
which certain practices, like the discharge of [endocrine-
disrupting] chemicals into the environment, in theory,
become morally reprehensible or unacceptable. On top of
the inability of the Aamjiwnaang community to produce a
single or distinct injured body, "unjustly altered," the
chronic low-dose exposures to pollution that are suspected
to be responsible for the "injury" are (for the most part, at
least) legally sanctioned and permitted. The actions of the
corporate polluters, instead of being seen as morally
reprehensible, are in fact state-sanctioned acts of productive
economic activity.
In this respect, law appears ambivalent to the
endocrine-disrupting pollution. The basis upon which the
prevailing regulatory approach rests is that pollution is
permitted according to certain specified limits or standards
set down in a regulation, and in the rare case where this
legally-sanctioned pollution results in proven harm, the
state relies on tort law to step in and provide compensation.
Civil remedies between individuals were long ago
7. Scott, supra note 1, at 244-45 (third and fourth alterations in original) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
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dismissed as being ineffective as legal tools for the general
systemic control of pollution (although they continue to be
relied upon to "pick up the slack" when things go wrong).
A regulatory approach was judged to be more effective.
The regime is typically administered by technical
agencies staffed with scientific and engineering experts
focused on determining the "safe" levels of various
pollutants in the environment. The job is one of identifying
pollution sources, bringing them under permit, and then
controlling the quality and quantity of emissions discharged
through the terms and conditions of the permit. The
underlying assumption is that the natural environment can
be used to assimilate (dilute and cleanse) the waste
generated through human activity. This [remains] the basis
for the contemporary regulatory regime: typically, the
governing statute contains a general discharge prohibition
on contaminants in combination with the issuance of
permits for emissions in accordance with a [certificate of
approval] issued by the relevant authority. The certificate
[of approval] is a legally binding licence that sets out the
conditions under which a facility can operate, [often]
including ... the maximum permissible contaminant
emission levels.
The ambivalence of our law, then, derives from the
continued prominence of the understanding of
environmental health harms as incidental to, and not central
to, industrial production. Any harm caused by legally
sanctioned, permitted pollution (as most of it is in Sarnia's
chemical corridor) is treated as a by-product or an
accidental side effect of the economic activity. It remains
"unintentional." And yet, pollution is a "fixed feature" of
modern economies. As Richard Lazarus has noted,
"pollution in our regulatory environment finds the pathway
of least resistance. It finds those places where the laws are
least enforced and least understood." The production of
chemicals, the refining of oil, and the generation of
BODY POLLUTED
electricity in the Sarnia corridor has harm and wounding
embedded in it. It is equally the production of pollution.'
A. "Wounding"
"Wounds adhere differently to different people." And
the act of wounding, as Jain shows, focuses attention on
things [that] were previously not clearly in view. But the
fact that the chronic contamination of the Aamjiwnaang
territory was only rendered visible by the sudden notoriety
of having the world's lowest birth ratio, is also largely due
to the nature of toxic chemical pollution. It is invisible. The
"risks" associated with it are virtually undetectable without
scientific investigation. They manifest as "harms caused by
molecules." To understand the mechanics of endocrine
disruption, for example, the way that certain chemicals
mimic hormones in the body by binding with available
receptors and influencing gene expression, we are forced to
rely on biomedical ways of knowing. The consequences of
exposure tend to eventually manifest themselves in ways
that start from within the body and work their way out.
Further, the latency period associated with many
contemporary environmental health risks underscores their
psychological impact in that it renders the experience of
risk unbounded: "an 'all clear' is never sounded." Bodies
contain chemicals banned years before the individual's
birth; contamination can be extremely long-lasting, and can
be passed down from generation to generation. For
example, in part because it is widely accepted among
epidemiologists that exposures to toxic chemicals in one
generation may produce effects in the next, no one can tell
the Aamjiwnaang community whether they face a present
danger, or are experiencing the latent manifestation of
exposures long past: as one Band member states, "[W]as it
me, was it my dad, my mom? ... [W]e don't know who's
been exposed."9
8. Id at 245-46 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)
(citations omitted).
9. Id at 246-47 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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B. The Gendering Effect of Endocrine Disruption
The mechanics of endocrine disruption are often
described in the following way. Certain synthetic chemicals
share structural features with common sex hormones; these
chemicals, or xenoestrogens, mimic hormone action in the
body by binding with, and activating, available hormone
receptors. The endocrine systems of the body are
understood as responsible for regulating complex and
interconnected physiological processes, and thus synthetic
chemicals that interfere with these systems are thought to
have profound and wide-ranging effects on health. As
hormones travel in the blood in very small concentrations,
even very low levels of xenoestrogens can disrupt the flow
of internal communications, triggering biological responses
and functions in the processes of embryonic growth and
development. Accordingly, susceptibility to xenoestrogens
is thought to depend highly on sex and on the timing of
exposures."o
We rarely hear about the phenomenon of endocrine disruption
without reference to the controversial theory of "feminization.""
This posits that we are experiencing, not just in humans but also in
animal species throughout the industrialized world, a feminization
trend that is observable across a variety of markers, including
decreased sperm counts, increasing rates of testicular cancers,
declining levels of testosterone, and high incidence of undescended
testes. 2 "These things theoretically have a common etiology,"
according to Dr. Devra Davis." Scientists hypothesize that a
declining sex ratio may be just one of a number of manifestations of
10. Id. at 248-49 (footnotes omitted).
11. Martin Mittelstaedt, Humanity at Risk: Are the Males Going First?, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Sept. 20, 2008, at F4.
12. Gina M. Solomon & Ted Schettler, Environment and Health: Endocrine Disruption and
Potential Human Health Implications, 163 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1471, 1472 (2000). Nancy
Langston also attributes rising "rates of intersexuality" to endocrine disruption. Nancy Langston,
The Retreat from Precaution: Regulating Diethylstilbestrol (DES), Endocrine Disruptors, and
Environmental Health, 13 ENVTL. HIST. 41, 41 (2008).
13. Mittelstaedt, supra note 11.
132
BODY POLLUTED
the feminization trend that is tied to endocrine disruption, which is
very broadly experienced across the industrialized world.14
The gender dimension of the "harm" experienced by
the Aamjiwnaang community is as difficult to demonstrate
as it is to dismiss. The impact of pollution seems not only to
be gendered, but gendering. By this I mean that the
endocrine disruptors do not just dole out their
environmental health horrors disproportionately as between
men and women, or girls and boys, they actually seem to be
driving whether we get girls or boys. The pollution is feared
to be actively producing gender....
The Aamjiwnaang experience is marked by the
individual trauma of repeated miscarriage and the collective
loss of a viable future. The skewed sex ratio, conceptualised
as a "harm," is one that is both visited specifically on
women, and felt by the community as a whole. As Joanne
Conaghan has argued and the previous part has made clear,
"harm" is an "unstable, slippery concept, highly dependent
on context and very much the subject of interpretation." But
at the same time, as Robin West has argued, the question of
what constitutes a "harm" is central to legal theory. Further,
the question is a critical one for feminists: as Martha
Chamallas and Linda Kerber have shown, tort law
traditionally falters when it is faced with claims based on
harms for which there is no "precise masculine analog."
According to Robin West's "connection thesis,"
women's material connection to future human life
necessarily produces a gendered notion of harm. The
prospect of pregnancy, of contributing to a future
generation, marks the key difference between women and
men. Underlying all branches of feminist theory, West says,
is the notion that "women's existential state . .. is grounded
in women's unique potential for physical, 'material
connection' to human life." This is the one place where
even feminism's divisions dissolve: we all come together,
she says, on the "discovery or rediscovery of the
14. Solomon & Schettler, supra note 12, at 1472-73; see Mittelstaedt, supra note 11.
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importance of women's fundamental material difference
from men."
Women are actually or potentially materially
connected to other human life. Men aren't. This material
fact has existential consequences . . . [it] defines women's
subjective, phenomenological and existential state, just as
surely as the inevitability of material separation from the
other defines men's existential state.Somewhat predictably,
then, Aamjiwnaang mothers and potential mothers, even if
they are not uniquely "harmed," are usually identified as the
medium through which the poisoning occurs: they are seen
as sites of contamination. The notion of the mothers as
mediums for the pollution is reinforced by various
strategies of resistance that have been employed by
residents of the Aamjiwnaang community themselves,
including "body burden" testing and "body mapping"
exercises, and even self-help strategies such as leaving the
reserve when trying to become or once becoming pregnant.
This is true even as the epidemiological evidence remains
contested as to the significance of the maternal influence. In
fact, the scientific literature that links endocrine disruptors
with skewed sex ratios focuses on male and female
reproduction, with researchers often unwilling to make a
call at this point as to which is the more likely mode of
action."
Sex is typically understood as a stable, pre-cultural reality
grounded in biology that can verified through a visual assessment,16
while gender is often understood to be socially constructed-a
product of our socialization. But it is not just gender that is
constructed, of course, it is sex as well. In the present example,
focusing our gaze on the declining sex ratio and the mechanics of
endocrine disruption brings the body into focus and exposes the
active construction and categorization of bodies into discrete sexes.
Conventional wisdom holds that sexual identity occurs
"naturally" as a binary category, which consists of two
15. Scott, supra note 1, at 247-48 (emphases added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
16. See Anne Bloom, To Be Real, 88 N.C. L. REv. 357, 413-24 (2010).
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"opposite" sexes: male and female. That there are only two
mutually exclusive categories is not questioned in the
environmental health movement. But as the growing
literature on intersexuality makes clear, "many bodies, even
in 'nature,' simply do not fit very well into the rigid
boundaries of a male/female classification." Conservative
estimates put the incidence of intersexuality at around 1 in
2000 births, with as many as 1 in 100 of us born with
bodies "differing" from the standard traits of male or
female. "
Where we draw the line between "male" and "female" is now
recognized as arbitrary, and sex is better understood as occupying a
continuum.
But, many will protest, surely genetics settles the
matter conclusively: it is the presence or absence of the Y
chromosome that creates a binary. Students of introductory
biology courses may recall a standard narrative something
along these lines: A person's sex is predetermined in the
sperm gamete. The cells of the egg gamete all possess the
XX sex chromosomes. Around half of the sperm gametes
contain the X chromosome and others possess the Y
chromosome. In light of this, there are two possibilities that
can occur during fertilisation between male and female
gametes, XY and XY. Since sperm are the variable factor,
they are responsible for determining sex.
In life, it turns out, it is more complicated. In some
cases, babies are born with an extra X or an extra Y, and
some babies are born with only one X. In many more cases,
babies are born with, or individuals develop later in their
life, physical traits that do not comport with the category
designated to them. For example, some XX individuals
have both ovaries and the reproductive equipment we might
typically associate with a male. And in many more cases
still, individuals exhibit personality traits or gender
identities that put them on a collision course with prevailing
cultural expectations about the characteristics that are
17. Scott, supra note 1, at 253 (citations omitted).
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typically associated with the two categories of sex identity.
If this all seems new, it is because, as Anne Bloom
demonstrates beautifully, several authoritative discourses
and institutions (law and medicine chief among them) have
"collaborated" so as "to make binary sexual difference
appear more 'natural' than it is."
Hormones, of course, are implicated as well.
According to the standard line, sex is determined by genetic
factors, and sexual differentiation is driven by hormones.
As Nelly Oudshoorn's work exposes, the "discovery" of
hormones early in the twentieth century became celebrated
as providing the "missing link" between genetic and
physiological models of sex determination. It quickly
became accepted that the "intentions of genes must always
be carried through by appropriate hormones." Accordingly,
hormones assumed the role of the "chemical messengers"
of masculinity and femininity....
... [I]f there is no natural categorisation of sexual
identity as a binary, perhaps there is no normal balance
between two discrete sexes." Without these critical
assumptions in place, how can we characterize the
declining sex ratio of the Aamjiwnaang community as a
harm? If not through recourse to what is "natural," on what
basis can we [ever] determine [whether] endocrine
disruption, or pollution, . . . is harmful? Can we say that
uninvited changes to bodies are unwelcome? That just as
"risks," however rational to incur at a societal level, are
unacceptable if they are imposed involuntarily or if they
result in the unfair sharing of benefits and burdens, so [the
uninvited interference with bodies, with reproduction] in
this case, is unacceptable?
[One answer is] that we validate the harms of the
pollution that are tied to illness and suffering and not those
that signify difference. Those harmed by the pollution are
18. As Anne Bottomley has noted, these assumptions have been fundamental: "knowledge,
of ourselves and of our world, has been predicated upon binary constructs of...
male/female. ... " Anne Bottomley, The Many Appearances of the Body in Feminist
Scholarship, in BODY LORE AND LAWS 127, 127 (Andrew Bainham et al. eds., 2002).
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the people living in Aamjiwnaang-they are the women,
men and children, mostly girls, but nevertheless the
children of the Band. They are:
the young [A]boriginal mothers, they are parents who
routinely receive 'emergency alerts' over the radio
indicating that they should 'Shelter in Place' as a result of
an incident or a 'fugitive release' from neighboring
industry, they are daycare workers responding to the sirens
by shuffling toddlers inside and closing the vents,.they are
health clinic staff staring down bewildering statistics, they
are teenagers struggling with asthma, developmental and
attention-deficit disorders, and they are young children
prevented from swimming in the contaminated creek that
passes through their traditional powwow grounds.These are
the people living with the effects of the chronic exposures
to pollution that emanate from Sarnia's Chemical Valley.
The community has more than its fair share of illness and
suffering: 17% of adults and 22% of children surveyed have
asthma; about 25% of adults experience high blood pressure
and/or chronic headaches; about 25% of children suffer
from learning disabilities and behavioural problems; and
about 40% of women have experienced miscarriage or
stillbirth. 19
Another answer is that we adopt an "embodied" approach that
validates the real and material consequences that the pollution is
having within bodies. Instead of insisting on some
"unified and singular bodily form of the male and the
female," [this approach would place] attention [on] the
universal human condition of being "in" our bodies. Human
embodiment spans all sorts of biological imperatives: from
hunger and excretion to aging and dying. It also includes
change through various life stages driven by hormonal
cycles. These cycles create windows of vulnerability that
have a distinct biological and thus gendered nature. It is
here that estrogens take on a pivotal role, and the role of
19. Scott, supra note 1, at 253, 255-56 (second emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)
(citations omitted).
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xenoestrogens, in particular, becomes salient. When
synthetic chemicals, uninvited, take over for hormones,
binding with available receptors and orchestrating
physiological processes, it has real, tangible, material
consequences for bodies. When this happens in the context
of reproduction, it has gendering consequences.20
Here, in the context of endocrine disruption on an Aboriginal
reserve surrounded by petrochemical production, these answers are
attractive because they seem to offer the potential to underscore the
blameworthiness of the ongoing pollution. But it is clear: the harm to
the community's sex ratio is a harm in the abstract.
Why should the [declining] sex ratio issue garner so much
attention when the actual suffering and poor health of living
beings-women, men and children-attracts only
indifference and dismissal? This brings us back to the
glaring unfairness of the pollution's disproportionate impact
on the native community in the context of their colonial
history. In fact, understanding why the [effects of chronic
pollution] might be showing up on the Aamjiwnaang
reserve and not in "white" Samia goes a long way to re-
centering the role of land, capital, race and colonisation.
The Aanishinaabek people have occupied their lands at the
southernmost tip of Lake Huron for hundreds of years. As
[B]and member Ron Plain will tell you, on the
Aamjiwnaang burial grounds, you will find the remains of
four generations of his ancestors, all in one place, literally
on the fenceline of a large refinery: "[W]e all lived here-
all our lives." The permanence of both the pollution and of
the Aamjiwnaang First Nation on the landscape, offers a
possible explanation for why we might see a
disproportionate effect of chronic pollution on this
community: they are grounded both spatially and
historically. If the mechanism behind the decline in sex
ratio has a generational component, it makes sense that it
would emerge in the First Nation community first. In south
Sarnia, for example, which might experience comparable
20. Id. at 256 (citations omitted).
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exposures to airborne pollutants, you are likely to find
people who were born all over the country, if not the world.
On the Aamjiwnaang reserve, you will not. It is a stark
reminder of how contemporary pollution exists in social
contexts that can exacerbate its effects.2 1
C. Collective Harm
The impact of the pollution on the Aamjiwnaang
people is imposed not only on individual bodies, of course,
but on the community as a whole. In fact, it is through the
work of feminist legal scholars towards exposing the nature
of gendered harm that we have come to clearly understand
that "injury has a social as well as an individual
dimension." As Joanne Conaghan states, a person's
membership in a "particular class, group, race or gender can
significantly shape the nature and degree of harm they
sustain." It is in this vein that I turn next to the notion of a
"collective harm" in the hopes that it can better capture the
wounds flowing from the sex ratio skewing on the
Aamjiwnaang reserve. As one [B]and member has stated:
"[O]ur daughters will have to go outside our community for
their partners." The concern is essentially one about cultural
survival. It is the collective loss of a viable future. Thus the
notion of a collective harm highlights the fact that this
problem is situated in the context of an aboriginal
community already struggling, as many are, with stemming
the loss of culture and tradition amongst their people.
"Injury," as David Engel argues, "opens a window
onto identity." This is because "[w]hen we say that an
individual has suffered an injury, we implicitly refer to a
self that is constituted in a particular way and is therefore
vulnerable to particular kinds of harm." It is the specific
history of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation which makes the
community, as a whole, particularly vulnerable to pollution
harm. As Robert Verchick makes clear:
[L]ocalised environmental hazards do not simply harm
21. Id. at 251 (footnote omitted).
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individuals, they erode family ties and community
relationships ... [they] create community-wide stress that will
debilitate the neighborhood in emotional, sociological, and
economic ways. To ignore this communal harm is to
underestimate severely the true risk involved.
Further, following Verchick, because emerging
environmental health harms are often localised and
concentrated, and because they tend to be distributed along
race and class differentials, the wound to the affected
community, in this case the Aamjiwnaang First Nation,
takes on a "profound moral character."22
As profound a wound as it is, it is clear that locating an injury in
individuals is not easy. Even locating a harm at the collective level is
fraught with difficulty: conceptualizing the wound suffered by the
Aamjiwnaang community (at least in terms of the declining sex ratio)
as a harm-in-fact demands allegiance to notions of the "natural" and
the "normal" that are highly contested. Contemporary pollution
22. Id. at 251-52 (second and fourth alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted). Just as Native Americans have characterized the U.S. military's poisoning of Indian
land as genocide, so the charge of cultural extermination has been leveled by residents in the case
of Aamjiwnaang with respect to the slow poisoning of their people and their traditional territory.
In this way, the theory of endocrine disruption, in the context of Aamjiwnaang, encounters a
history that, at various times, has included denying racialized groups the capacity for children. Is
forced sterilization-the "racist form of mass 'birth control"' described by Angela Davis as it has
applied historically to poor black women in the American context-any different from what is
happening today on the Aamjiwnaang reserve? Angela Davis, Racism, Birth Control, and
Reproductive Rights, in THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS READER: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF MOTHERHOOD 86, 86 (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008). Class bias and racism, as
Davis notes, have always contributed to how we, collectively, figure out who may legitimately
contribute to the next generation, to the "future." See id. at 88-92. Similarly, Dorothy Roberts has
exposed how the material conditions of poverty and oppression have limited the reproductive
choices for poor women of color who have been "deemed not even worthy of the dignity of
childbearing." Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1458 (1991). A parallel could be
drawn between historical practices of eugenics-in which outsiders decided on behalf of women,
and their communities, whose lives would be worth living and whose children would be welcome
in this world-and the current political economy of pollution in Canada. See Ruth Hubbard,
Abortion and Disability: Who Should and Who Should Not Inhabit the World, in THE DISABILITY
STUDIES READER 187 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997) (discussing the history of eugenics). Perhaps
our attitudes toward the evidence of endocrine disruption and its role in the ability of the
Aamjiwnaang to replace itself are based on a "cluster of unexamined and unspoken
preconceptions about who should and who should not inhabit the world." Shelley Tremain,
Theoretical Perspectives on the Construction on the Gendered Body and Disability, in I HEAD,
HEART AND HAND: PARTNERSHIPS FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH IN CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTS 455,
481 (Penny van Esterik ed., 2003). Is the lack of public outcry merely a reverberation of Canada's
own genocidal past? Is it cultural extermination by a new mechanism?
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harms are diffuse, body-altering, cumulative, and probably
generational in character. There is wounding to be accounted for, but
it is the kind of harm that pushes the limits of our current legal
imagination.
IV. IMAGINING A REMEDY
A tort is a legal construct: it only exists in cases where there is a
wrong for which the law provides a remedy.23 In general, tort law
provides that compensation, usually in the form of money damages,
be paid for an injury suffered as a result of the wrongful conduct of
others.24 Can tort law provide a remedy for the injury suffered by the
Aamjiwnaang? In the first section of what follows, I offer a critique
of tort damages based on the idea of a liberal, individual legal subject
grounded in feminist theory of the body. In the second section, I
engage in a somewhat creative, or perhaps playful, take on torts in
which I consider various torts on a conceptual level and what
remedies they might offer the Aamjiwnaang. In each case, what the
tort can do depends on how the injury-and the scale defining the
injury-are conceived.
A. Beyond Individual Legal Subjects
The central difficulty for tort law in providing an effective
remedy to the Aamjiwnaang community derives from its underlying
assumption that "society is composed of free separate, autonomous
individuals, competing with each other in pursuit of their own self-
interest."" Tort law is defined as the law governing the obligations
that persons are deemed to owe each other.26 This is where a feminist
critique gains traction. Where "tort law, as traditionally presented,
presupposes the essential separateness of individuals from each
23. LEWIs N. KLAR, TORT LAW 1 (4th ed. 2008) (citing Justice La Forest in Angus v. Hart
[1988], 2 S.C.R. 256, 264, para. 17 (Can.)).
24. Id. (citing Justice Cory in Hall v. Hebert [1993], 2 S.C.R. 159, 200, para. 58 (Can.)).
25. Joanne Conaghan, Gendered Harms and the Law of Tort: Remedying (Sexual)
Harassment, 16 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 407, 408 (1995).
26. See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010), available at LEXIS-BTINES.
Presumably, on an equal basis-never mind that, in most cases-the idea of a relationship of
formal equality between the plaintiff and the defendant is a pure fantasy.
141Fall 2010]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 44:121
other, feminist perspectives recognise, from the very outset, our
necessary interconnectedness.""
Robin West, as noted in Part II, challenges the notion of
"separateness" for women based on her connection thesis: "Women
are not essentially, necessarily, inevitably, invariably, always, and
forever separate from other human beings . . ."28 Her thesis is
strengthened by emerging work by scholars of fetal microchimerism,
such as Aryn Martin, who demonstrate that not only is women's
"separateness" challenged by the possibility of reproduction but the
maternal body is also "irretrievably transformed by the experience of
pregnancy." 29 As these scholars have shown, the boundaries of
human individuality are permanently blurred by the fluid movement
and exchange of cells that occurs between a mother and her fetus.30
Children of all genders will forever harbor cells belonging to their
mothers within their own bodies." And so we can challenge the
separation thesis on a deeper level: not only should women not be
conceived of as completely separate from other life, but men should
not either. All living things are embedded and interwoven into larger
webs of being.
The idea of humans as organisms embedded in dynamic systems
invites a Deleuzian conception of the body, which does not rely on
an individuated subject.3 2 As Elizabeth Grosz argues, we need to
understand the body "not as an organism or entity in itself, but as a
system, or series of open-ended systems, functioning within other
huge systems it cannot control . . . ."" Applying this perspective
places the Aamjiwnaang people as subjects immersed in a social,
ecological, political, and historical context that accentuates their
27. Joanne Conaghan, Tort Law and the Feminist Critique of Reason, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECTS OF LAW 47, 47 (Anne Bottomley ed., 1996).
28. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (emphasis
added).
29. Aryn Martin, "Your Mother's Always with You ": Material Feminism and Fetomaternal
Microchimerism, 33 RESOURCES FOR FEMINIST RES. (SPECIAL ISSUE) (forthcoming 2009).
30. See West, supra note 28, at 2-3.
31. See id. at 21.
32. Bottomley, supra note 18, at 140. Instead, a Deleuzian conception, in Anne Bottomley's
words, calls for a "morphing of the body into a site of patterns, flows and intensities in which the
emphasis is continually on movement." Id.




vulnerabilities to the pollution-to the intensities and flows operating
at a molecular level, to the energies and connections between
synthetic hormones and available receptors within bodies. In
emphasizing the capacity of bodies to affect and be affected by other
bodies, this conception, therefore, "undermines the notion of a fixed
boundary between subject and object and between the self and its
other."34 It represents a shift away from the notion of the self as the
primary subject of central control." As Richardson argues, however,
this is not necessarily as conceptually debilitating as one might
assume: "A distinct self does emerge but through patterns of
relationality rather than in opposition from its other.""
The challenge to these generally accepted boundaries of the
person raises obvious questions of human agency." We are all
"organisms assimilating, seeking, manipulating [our] worlds, even as
[we] accommodate and respond to them."" In other words, we are
neither completely free and autonomous nor passive. The image of
endocrine disruption constructed by scientists in fact reinforces the
idea that matter is inherently interactive, not inert. The metaphor of
hormones as messengers-moving through the body, picking up
"packages" from the "outside," delivering the packages to receptive
agents, igniting and transforming productive processes-reinforces
the understanding that bodies are dynamic systems.
As Richardson argues, a "refusal to delineate fixed boundaries
between the self and its supposed 'outside' offers a new approach to
the law of obligations."" The focus on individuals as the point of
departure in tort law needs to be challenged. But the individual as the
fundamental entity of social existence is central to liberal thought:
"We are individuals, because we are separate from one another."4 0
34. JANICE RICHARDSON, SELVES, PERSONS, INDIVIDUALS: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON WOMEN AND LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 27 (2004).
35. See id. at 27-28.
36. Id. at 27.
37. Id. at 31.
38. SUSAN OYAMA, EVOLUTION'S EYE: A SYSTEMS VIEW OF THE BIOLOGY-CULTURE
DIVIDE 95 (2000).
39. RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 31.
40. Ted Decoste, Taking Torts Progressively, in TORT THEORY 240, 243 (Ken Cooper-
Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993).
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And this is not just in a physical sense: "what is important for the
liberal is that our individuation is normative."4 1
We are individuals because we choose to be. Individualism is
the foundation for the sacred liberal values of choice, autonomy, and
self-determination.42
One of the basic assumptions in tort law is that we are
envisaged as individuals who are owners of our own
abilities, such as our ability to work and our bodies. If
anyone negligently injures us or prevents us from being
able to earn a living we can claim damages because we own
parts of our bodies and life chances in a way that is
analogous to the way in which we own property.43
The declining sex ratio emerges as an eruption of
unpredictability in a material world that is otherwise tightly
structured by forces external to the Aamjiwnaang. We need a broader
conception of the legal subject to adequately understand the harm
where the subjects of pollution are 'not easily characterized as
individual, liberal, monadic entities, but are instead understood as
embedded in cultural histories, tied to the land, and inseparable from
local intensities and flows, emitted particles, energies, and
connections operating on a molecular level.
Why is the individual person the appropriate unit or level of
analysis for assessing tort-law damages? Why not assess it at the
level of communities or, conversely, at the molecular level? Why not
assess it at the level of cells? Legal scholars, such as Christian
Witting and Donal Nolan, have begun exploring the idea that tort law
is too corporeal-that it is tethered too tightly to proof of physical
damages-and should move toward the recognition of interests-
based damages in certain contexts." But even where recent tort
scholarship has included some calls for expansion of what should
4 1. Id.
42. Id.
43. RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 77.
44. Christian Witting, Physical Damage in Negligence, 61 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 189 (2002)
[hereinafter Witting, Physical Damage]; see also Donal Nolan, New Forms of Damage in
Negligence, 70 MOD. L. REV. 59 (2007) (discussing the development of new forms of actionable
damages in negligence); Christian Witting, The House That Dr. Beever Built: Corrective Justice,
Principle and the Law of Negligence, 71 MOD. L. REV. 621 (2008) [hereinafter Witting, Dr.
Beever] (discussing tort law's role in protecting interests-based damages).
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count as harm or "physical damage,"45 the scale at which we look to
find such damage remains locked at the level of the individual-the
single unitary legal subject.
Witting argues that we should move away from assessing
physical damage only on the basis of a factually observable change
in the physical structure of persons and advocates for a more
contextual approach based on social perceptions of damage.46 As
Nolan says, "the boundaries of the concept of physical damage are
not always clear" and could be expanded. 47 This goes some way
toward opening up the question of what constitutes physical damage,
but leaves unexplored, for now, the matter of the appropriate scale on
which we should measure it. In what follows, I explore the way
various torts might operate at different scales of injury to provide a
remedy to the Aamjiwnaang community.
To begin, if we take the injury to have occurred inside bodies,
then perhaps we would turn to the tort of battery.
B. Offensive Contact with the Body / Battery
Is there a right to physical integrity or bodily inviolability?
Control over our bodies represents a key feminist objective. The
notion that we are individual, autonomous bodies would seem to
demand that we are all able to "resist the intrusions of others." 4 8
Presumably this includes the ability to say "yes" or "no" to bodily
penetration by synthetic chemicals capable of causing material
changes to key metabolic processes within us. So what if individual
women in Aamjiwnaang cannot demonstrate a factually observable
change-a visible and tangible harm? Isn't any interference with our
bodies that we have not consented to capable of constituting a harm?
Consider the tort of battery. It is said to protect a person's "right
to be free from offensive physical contacts." 49 It guards the security
45. See Witting, Physical Damage, supra note 44; see also Nolan, supra note 44 (discussing
forms of actionable damage other than "physical damage"); Nicky Priaulx, That's One Heck of an
"Unruly Horse"! Riding Roughshod over Autonomy in Wrongful Conception, 12 FEMINIST
LEGAL STUD. 317 (2004) (discussing the damage of reproductive autonomy in tort law); Witting,
Dr. Beever, supra note 44 (discussing interests-based damages in tort law).
46. Witting, Physical Damage, supra note 44, at 190.
47. Nolan, supra note 44, at 61.
48. ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW 97 (1997).
49. KLAR, supra note 23, at 46.
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of the person and protects the "right to autonomy over one's own
body.""o The tort of battery "does not require that the contact be
physically harmful to its recipient, or cause any personal injury.""
Apparently, any offensive contact qualifies, "however trivial it may
seem, if it has the potential to affect dignity and self-respect."52
But to be actionable, the offensive contact must be either
intentional or negligent." The contact does not need to be person-to-
person but it must be physical.5 4 In our example, what would
constitute the offensive contact? Is it the synthetic estrogens entering
the body? Is it when they bind to and activate receptors in cells?
How can we attach intention to these contacts?
We could point to offensive conduct, such as the release of
chemicals into the air or water, that we may be able to argue is
intentional or negligent. An advantage of the tort of battery over the
tort of negligence is that the "burden of disproving intention or ...
falls upon the defendant, once the elements of the tort have been
proved."" The polluters would bear the burden of providing emission
data, dispersion models, and epidemiological evidence; the polluters
would have to argue that the "contact" between their synthetic
estrogens released freely into the air, and our estrogen receptors,
hiding deep in our own bodies, was neither foreseeable, predictable,
nor inevitable.
However, with the tort of battery, legal authority provides a
defense. As mentioned, most of the pollution in Sarnia's Chemical
Valley is state sanctioned. The polluters have permits to emit. These
certificates of approval constitute a legally binding license that sets
out the conditions under which a facility can operate. So, as long as
the facility stays within the maximum permissible contaminant
50. Id.
51. Id
52. ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 43 (6th ed. 1997).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 50.
55. Id. at 51 (footnote omitted). Negligent battery is the unreasonable disregard of a
foreseeable risk of contact, even if the contact is not desired or substantially certain to occur. Id.
at 56.
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emission levels as detailed in its permit, the defense of legal
authority seems likely to preclude any finding of liability."
Next, if we take the injury to have occurred to individuals, we
would look to the tort of negligence. Specifically, we might employ
the "lost chance" doctrine.
C. Lost Chances /Negligence
When a plaintiff cannot establish that a defendant's negligence
caused her injury on a balance of probabilities, her negligence claim
will fail. This is true even if the defendant's negligent conduct
increased the possibility of her injury, but did not probably cause it."
In the case of Aamjiwnaang mothers (or fathers), if the injury were
endocrine disruption, causation would likely be difficult to prove."
But what if we redefine the very nature of the injury itself? What if
the lost chances to bear sons are the harm? The effect of the synthetic
chemicals in the body produced-caused-an increased chance of
conceiving an embryo that would become a girl (given there was
already, surely, an almost even chance of that outcome). According
to this narrative, the negligent actions of the polluters, which
increased the possibility of endocrine disruption, effectively deprived
56. Although, in Canada, there is authority for the proposition that the issuance of a
certificate of approval does not provide a full defense to the permit holder from a civil action
arising from the approved activity. B.C. Pea Growers Ltd. v. Portage La Prairie, [1966] S.C.R.
150 (Can.); see also MARIO D. FAIETA ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL HARM: CIVIL ACTIONS AND
COMPENSATION 242 (1996). In negligence law, while the standard of care is normally limited to
the discharge of statutory obligations, there are Canadian cases that suggest that compliance with
statutory regulations does not necessarily preclude civil liability for negligence. Ryan v. Corp. of
Victoria, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 201 (Can.).
57. Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 (Can.), holds that causation will be established
when the defendant's negligent conduct is the probable cause (proven on a balance of
probabilities). Similarly, in Cottrelle v. Gerrard, (2003), 233 D.L.R. 4th 45 (Can. Ont. C.A.), the
court held that it was not sufficient to show that adequate diagnosis and treatment would have
increased the chance for recovery for a patient, the recovery needed to be more likely than not.
The "material contribution" test is generally used in situations where a plaintiff may be exposed
to harmful substances from various sources, but cannot prove precisely that the substance
resulting from the defendant's tortious conduct caused the loss. Id. at para. 30. The material-
contribution test is used where the "but for" test is inoperable and it is clear that the defendant
breached a duty of care, thereby exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury of the
type that the plaintiff suffered. Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333, para. 24-26
(Can.). A contributing factor is material when it falls outside the de minimis range. Athey, [1996]
3 S.C.R. at 461.
58. The hypothetical claim goes like this: "this synthetic chemical released by this polluter
entered my body and activated available hormone receptors at a key moment in my development
which had growth, metabolic, or reproductive consequences."
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the families on the reserve of chances to welcome boys." The lost
chances themselves constitute the injury, and the families are owed
compensation.
Used most often in contract cases and increasingly in medical
malpractice litigation, the lost chance doctrine can compensate
individuals for lost opportunities, based on probabilistic estimates of
what would have been expected in the absence of negligence-
expectations of what "could have been."60 So, if an agency
improperly disqualifies a lottery ticket diminishing chances of
winning, for example, or if a doctor makes mistakes in the course of
a person's cancer treatment diminishing the chance of that patient's
survival, there is the possibility of recovery, in some jurisdictions,61
for "lost chance."62
For personal injury litigators, the lost chance doctrine offers
several advantages. Most importantly, injury and compensation are
understood in terms of a lost opportunity or a heightened risk, rather
than an ultimate injury, concrete and visible in the body.63 Thus, the
59. Under this scenario, the hypothetical narrative is this: "this synthetic estrogen released
by this polluter entered my body and activated available estrogen receptors at a key moment in
the embryo's early development thus 'causing' me to conceive an embryo that would become a
girl, instead of a boy .. "
60. Jeremy Pryor, Lost Profit or Lost Chance: Reconsidering the Measure of Recovery for
Lost Profits in Breach of Contract Actions, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 561, 561-63 (2007).
61. See Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272 (Ind. 2000); Verdicchio v. Ricca, 843 A.2d
1042 (N.J. 2004). There is no such possibility of recovery in Canada. See KLAR, supra note 23, at
116. In the Canadian case of Cotrelle, 233 D.L.R. 4th 45, the court found that it was not enough
that but for the defendant's breach, there was a chance of a recovery. The chance of recovery
must be more likely than not. Id.
62. For a discussion of lost chance in contract cases, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Probability
and Chance in Contract Law, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1005, 1049-52 (1998) and Pryor, supra note 60,
at 571-76. A leading case dealing with the wrongful disqualification of a contestant in a
competition states, "Where by contract a [person] has a right to belong to a limited class of
competitors, [that person] is possessed of something of value, and it is the duty of the jury to
estimate the pecuniary value of that advantage ..... Chaplin v. Hicks, (1911) 2 K.B. 786, 796
(Eng.). In the medical malpractice arena, Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966), is
considered a leading case: "If there is any substantial possibility of surviving and the defendant
has destroyed it, he is answerable." Id. at 632.
63. See Joseph H. King, Jr., "Reduction ofLikelihood" Reformulation and Other Retrofitting
of the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 492 (1998) ("[W]hen a defendant
tortiously destroys or reduces a victim's prospects for achieving a more favorable outcome, the
plaintiff should be compensated for that lost prospect. Damages should be based on the extent to
which the defendant's tortious conduct reduced the plaintiffs likelihood of receiving a better
outcome." (footnotes omitted)).
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doctrine potentially provides a way around the difficult questions of
causation and harm that plague most toxic tort cases."4
Usually in these cases, however, it is unproblematically stated
that the plaintiff has lost her chance to achieve a preferred
outcome-a more favorable result. As Professor Joseph King, a
leading proponent of the doctrine in the United States, notes, the loss
of a chance is the loss of "achieving a favorable outcome or of
avoiding an adverse consequence . .. ."65 The doctrine rests on the
idea that "depriving a person of the chance of good results is in fact
harmful to that person."66 Chance has value. But, does applying the
doctrine to the declining Aamjiwnaang sex ratio imply that boy
babies are preferred to girl babies? That having a boy would
constitute a more favorable result? That a boy child is more valuable
to families and communities than a girl child? How can we call a
failure to produce boys a harm without devaluing girls?
We might turn to the so-called wrongful birth cases for insight
in this regard. 7 In these cases, parents file negligence claims for
faulty sterilization procedures or incorrect contraception advice that
result in the birth of an unwanted child." When a doctor's negligence
results in the birth of a healthy child, the assessment of damages
becomes a difficult issue.69 Courts have made surprising findings in
this regard; for example, in one case the court stated categorically
that "the benefits a child brings to a family outweigh the costs of that
child to a family."" Apparently, even if the child were unwanted-
where the parents had taken specific steps to avoid the child's birth,
and the child would not have been born but for the negligence of a
64. See, e.g., Kristin Bohlken, Fitting the Square Peg of Alternative Toxic Tort Remedies
into the Round Hole of Traditional Tort Law, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 263, 264 (1996) (noting that
strict causation and present-injury requirements have prevented most tort claims resulting from
toxic exposure from succeeding).
65. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1354 (1981).
66. KLAR, supra note 23, at 453.
67. Wrongful birth cases in general are brought by parents who claim that the birth of their
child should not have occurred; wrongful life cases are brought by the children claiming that their
lives should not have occurred and would not have but for the doctor's negligence. See id at 419.
68. RICHARDSON, supra note 34, at 75.
69. See Kealey v. Berezowski (1996), 30 O.R. 3d 37 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.); RICHARDSON,
supra note 34, at 420.
70. M.Y. v. Boutros, 2002 ABQB 362, para. 158 (Can.).
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professional with a specific duty to prevent the child's birth-a
healthy child could still be considered a blessing."
In other cases, there is a different formulation of the harm. The
child itself is not considered a harm, but the negligent interference
with autonomy-with reproductive choice and control-is
considered a harm that should be compensated for.7 2 What becomes
very clear in thinking through these issues is the difficulty that arises
with objective determinations of harm. A healthy child is a blessing
to some, but a burden to others.
Perhaps the image that best exemplifies the nagging inadequacy
of how we find a harm in the Aamjiwnaang situation is not the
classic lost-chance lottery-ticket analogy (because money is
universally accepted as a desired outcome in the context of
lotteries!), but a Midway game at a fair. Suppose that all of the prizes
available for winners in the game are, objectively speaking, equal in
value. You win the game and spin the wheel to determine your prize.
But suppose the wheel is improperly weighted so that it is much less
likely to stop on the prize that you want. Someone has interfered with
your autonomy. Never mind that you do not have full control over
the outcome. There is an element of chance. This is true with respect
to reproduction, as it is true with respect to cancer, lotteries, and
Midway games.
What about filing a lost-chance class action at the community
level for the denial of the chance of reproducing and continuing in
existence?
As explored earlier, the harm suffered by the members of the
Aamjiwnaang is rendered visible through the "statistical vision" of
epidemiology.7 3 At an individual level it cannot be seen, yet in the
aggregate it is obvious. There is perhaps a parallel here to the
struggle for pay equity.74 Just as individual Aamjiwnaang mothers'
71. For sharp commentary, see RICHARDSON, supra note 34.
72. See Kealey, 30 0R. 3d at 70-71.
73. Sheila Jasanoff, Science and the Statistical Victim: Modernizing Knowledge in Breast
Implant Litigation, 32 SOC. STUD. SC. 37, 64 (2002).
74. Pay equity is a compensation practice aimed at addressing the gender wage gap by
basing pay decisions on the value of work performed. Heidi 1. Hartmann & Stephanie Aaronson,
Pay Equity and Women's Wage Increases: Success in the States, A Model for the Nation, 1 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 69, 71 (1994). Sex-based wage discrimination, even though the wage gap
hovers around 30 percent, had to be proven to be believed; the same was true for the sex ratio
disparity at Aamjiwnaang. Scott, Chronic Pollution, supra note 4, at 304; see Rosemary Hunter,
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complaints of "so many girls" being born are easily dismissed in
encounters with doctors' offices and public health units, individual
women's complaints of "so little pay" are also routinely dismissed in
encounters with lawyers and bosses. But at the population level the
claims come into sharp relief, and the imbalance-the unfairness-is
exposed.
But there is a downside to this move as well. Once aggregated,
the harms graduate from subjective claims into statistical
correlations. The focus is no longer on individual harm, but on
probabilistic harm across disembodied populations. In exchange for
the shift in focus that allows recognition of the aggregate harm, we
forfeit detail at the level of individual lives. In revealing the pattern,
individual stories get lost. But here-for both the depressed sex ratio
and the depressed wages of women-the shift has the potential to
overcome the tendency to dismiss each individual woman's
complaint as a result of chance and to bring back the social origins of
the problem and the blameworthiness of those who perpetuate it.
D. Reparation /Retribution
In each and every one of these imagined tort claims, it will
always come down to a question of remedy. The primary remedy in
tort is money damages." In general, the aim is to translate the lost
intangibles into monetary terms, which involves not only tricky
exercises in valuation but also a good deal of "fortune telling"-in
that it demands the prediction of future events.7 6 There is no question
that the tort system at present reflects and reinforces the view that
money can substitute for health." Jain calls this the "trope of
compensation."" Based on the idea of reparable harm, the legal logic
Afterword: A Feminist Response to the Gender Gap in Compensation Symposium, 82 GEO. L.J.
147, 148-53 (1993) (examining the history of gender-based wage discrimination and
undervaluation of women's work).
75. See JOANNE CONAGHAN & WADE MANSELL, THE WRONGS OF TORT 56 (1993).
76. Id at 58.
77. Id at 61; Elaine Gibson, The Gendered Wage Dilemma in Personal Injury Damages, in
TORT THEORY, supra note 40, at 185, 189. This further reinforces the way that tort law is
invested in the individuated legal subject. As Alan Hyde states, "[bjehind ... the entire practice
of monetary compensation for bodily injury must lie a hazy notion of the body as 'property' 'lost'
to its owner." HYDE, supra note 48, at 63.
78. SARAH S. LOCHLANN JAIN, INJURY: THE POLITICS OF PRODUCT DESIGN AND SAFETY
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (2006).
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demands that the injury be made calculable in market terms, so that
the injury can be "undone" through the monetary award of damages,
and the injured can "buy back" what was lost."
Can we "buy back" what has been taken from the Aamjiwnaang
community? This must be where the parallel with pay equity breaks
down. Pay equity can be addressed in monetary terms-the claims
are actually about money. A depressed sex ratio is not about money,
and it is only tangentially about health. "Recovery," in law, is meant
to restore, repair, or compensate a victim as a matter of justice.so It
aims to return the injured person to the condition she would have
been in had the injury not occurred. The prospect of recovery for the
Aamjiwnaang community makes it very clear that the wound, in this
case, is much deeper than the injury-the wound will never be closed
by a damages award (even if any were forthcoming).
Can this injury be reversed? Can a community recover from
endocrine disruption? There is some ecological evidence suggesting
it is likely that-at the population level at least-once the key
exposures stop, the effects of endocrine disruption will begin to
reverse." If reversing such effects is the community's goal, then the
remedy best suited is not damages-but injunction.
In conceiving the injury to have occurred at the scale of the
community, we might also consider the tort of nuisance. Nuisance is
attractive, at least conceptually, because the remedies available
include both damages and injunction.82
E. Bad Neighbors /Nuisance
The tort of nuisance deals with relations between neighbors."
Often, we think of neighbors in a physical sense, as groups or
individuals occupying adjacent pieces of land or at least being in a
permanent state of proximity to each other. Generally, we
acknowledge that neighbors do not choose each other. The
79. Id.
80. KLAR, supra note 23, at 11, 13.
81. See Karen A. Kidd et al., Collapse of a Fish Population After Exposure to a Synthetic
Estrogen, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 8897 (2007).
82. See KLAR, supra note 23, at 715 (discussing how a public nuisance can constitute the
basis for a private right of action for damages or injunction).
83. See cONAGHAN & MANSELL, supra note 75, at 107.
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Aamjiwnaang and the Chemical Valley industry would likely meet
this expectation.84
There are two classes of claims in nuisance. The first-private
nuisance-specifically addresses unlawful interference with the use
or enjoyment of land." What is "unlawful"? It is "substantial and
unreasonable" interference." The second-public nuisance-applies
when environmental harm generally affects a large class of people at
the same time." For public nuisance, a plaintiff can only succeed if
she suffers special injury in the nature of personal injury or property
damage." The Aamjiwnaang's interest in land on the reserve is
considered only possessory-but courts have found that sufficient to
ground a claim for nuisance.8 9
On the surface, it seems that there are good arguments for the
Aamjiwnaang under either branch of nuisance law. Under private
nuisance, however, the Aamjiwnaang would have to overcome the
hurdle of "lawfulness," or "legal authority," as discussed earlier.
Under public nuisance, the Aamjiwnaang would be returned to the
problem of demonstrating a personal injury, in an individual. For
these reasons, nuisance law has proven relatively impotent in fights
between communities and industry.90 Further, the "wrong" would
essentially lie in the violation of property rights and not in the
interference with bodily integrity. As a result, even without assessing
the loss in terms of money damages, it remains a commodification of
the body, and of the community, because it relegates those interests
to the property interest.
This discussion has skimmed over the question of whether
compensation is the only legitimate goal of tort law.9 What about
other goals, such as justice, deterrence, education, punishment of
84. Although, on certain environmental justice or historical accounts, this may be open to
debate. Did the chemical industry "choose" the Aamjiwnaang as their neighbors?
85. Lynda Collins, Protecting Aboriginal Environments: A Tort Law Approach, in CRITICAL
TORTS 61, 70-71 (Sandra Rodgers et al. eds., 2009).
86. See Tock v. St. John's Metro. Area Bd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1181, 1192 (Can.).
87. Collins, supra note 85, at 71.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 74.
90. CONAGHAN & MANSELL, supra note75, at 107.
91. See, e.g., Bruce Feldthusen, If This Is Torts, Negligence Must Be Dead, in TORT
THEORY, supra note 40, at 394, 407-09.
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carelessness, and retribution? In fact, in early conceptions of tort law,
it was the victim's vengeance that was said to have been "purchased"
by the offer of compensation.9 2 Money flowed from the aggressor to
the victim, essentially in exchange for community peace." On
reflection, of all of these potential aims of tort law, compensation is
the only one that really turns on the relationship between individuals;
the others are more open to alternative conceptions of harm and
alternative scales to define injury.9 4
V. CONCLUSIONS
Contemporary pollution harms are pervasive, diffuse, body-
altering, cumulative, and generational in character; the links between
those harms and the suspected chemical culprits are tenuous and
contested. Further, the harms are neither randomly distributed nor
uniformly experienced. Tort law in its current form falls short of
capturing the essence of this pollution because, in transforming the
harm into a form cognizable by law, we are forced to locate it in
separate, autonomous individuals. As Alan Hyde notes:
[L]aw's discourse of the body constructs the body as a
thing, separate from the person, but the bearer of that
person .... The legal subject is an individual, and so is that
subject's body. Each body is an individuated entity with
distinct boundaries, an outside and an inside."
Tort law, conventionally conceived, is an expression of the
"liberal preference for non-intervention by the state into social
arrangements." 6 It offers a private law solution between individuals.
It is utterly unable to account for the way the pollution has saturated
the community, been soaked up in bodies, and dissolved boundaries
between selves and others. But brainstorming around tort law's
potential remedies, at various scales, allows for the body to be
opened up-the gender-bending synthetic chemicals flowing through
bodies become visible, exposing the way they freely move between
92. Lucie L6ger, The Culture of the Common Law in the 21st Century: Tort Law's Response
to the Needs ofa Pluralist Society, in TORT THEORY, supra note 40, at 162, 165.
93. See id
94. Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 485, 501 (1989).
95. HYDE, supra note 48, at 258.
96. Conaghan, supra note 25, at 408 (footnote omitted).
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individuals and their worlds-to the point that our insistence on a
fixed bodily boundary and a centrally controlled self begins to break
down.
In fact, the scale at which we conceive of an injury shapes the
determination of whether, and on what terms, the injury is seen as
remediable. Further, as William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and
Austin Sarat demonstrated almost thirty years ago, these conceptions
and determinations are implicit in the process of "naming," which
shapes ideas about the allocation of blame for the harm."
Accordingly, just as Alan Hyde shows how various constructions of
the body in jurisprudence carry consequences for actual persons,9 8
here we see that our own constructions of "injury"-where and how
we choose to find it--carry consequences for communities affected
by contemporary pollution harms. In all likelihood, those
constructions carry consequences for the just resolution of many
other types of injuries for which we currently do not recognize
remedies, as well.
Lucie White shows that whether or not an injury will indelibly
mark its subject is often indeterminable.9 9 To say that the harm itself
is collective is to open it up to a trajectory that depends on actors
outside of the subject. Further, as Marc Galanter argues, there is a
mutually constitutive relationship between injuries and remedies,
such that the remedy itself, or the process of seeking the remedy, or
of negotiating a path forward without a remedy, may institute a
process of healing, at various scales, that transforms the ultimate
effect of the injury.'
Alan Hyde argues that we should "strive for a law and politics of
embodied subjects." 0 ' As legal speakers, we choose when and how
97. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming ... ,15 LAW& SOC'Y REv. 631, 635 (1981).
98. Hyde's analysis uncovers the "multiple competing constructions of the body [that] are
available to legal and other speakers," and shows that these constructions are "neither natural, nor
limited by biology." HYDE, supra note 48, at viii. As he demonstrates, actors choose among these
competing constructions for instrumental purposes: he takes the project of "denaturalization" to
be an aim of critical legal scholarship. Id. at viii-ix.
99. I attribute this idea to Lucie White's presentation at the symposium. Lucie White,
Remarks at Loyola Law School Los Angeles Symposium: Injuries Without Remedies (Mar. 26,
2010).
100. Marc Galanter, The Dialectic ofInjury and Remedy, 44 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011).
101. See HYDE, supra note 48, at 262.
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to "configure the body in relationship to others." 0 2 In our tort
jurisprudence, in our determinations of what may count as harm, we
need a jurisprudence that is truer to human experience. The task, as
Leslie Bender frames it, is only to imagine creative, new remedies
that can work to restore dignity and social equality, and remedies that
acknowledge collective harms based on the interconnectedness of
life. 103
102. Id. at 9.
103. See Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 901-09.
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